

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

The Disconnect Between Torah Learning and Torah Living

I WOULD LIKE to comment on the article written by Dr. Fried. The problem is dealt with very thoroughly, but of course, there is always room for additional thoughts.

A number of years ago, at one of the first meetings called by the Shalom Task Force, the question was asked, “Why is it that the problem of verbal abuse, and perhaps even worse, is found among *bnei Torah*?”

The question was first presented to *haRav* Pam זצ”ל and various answers were given. One that I recall made a distinction between graduates of boys’ *yeshivos* and those of girls’ schools. It was pointed out that in the Bais Yaa-kov–type school, girls are called upon to do acts of *chesed*, to help the elderly and other people in need. The actions they perform focus on these needs and have a lasting effect upon the *talmidos*.

In boys’ *yeshivos* the major emphasis is on the study of *Gemara* and *meforshim*. No one questions this type of curriculum. It has been established by the *Gedolei ha-Torah* of our time. Yet, it is possible that these *bachurim* miss something and it may explain their occasional errant behavior. Dr. Fried speaks frequently about the need to have a “gut feeling”; in other words, if I understand this correctly, he would like to see *bnei Torah* have a “gut

feeling” about rejecting anything that is not acceptable behavior.

It brings to mind a comment made by Avi Ezer in explaining the words “*lo youchal*” found frequently in the Torah. He has an enigmatic explanation. He says, שיהא הדבר אליך באזהרה גדולה כאלו לא תוכל. אין יכולת בידך לעשו'. The Torah wants a person to develop his character to the extent that he finds it impossible to do a wrongful thing.

In years past we had the privilege of hearing from the late *Rav* Soloveitchick זצ”ל explanations about a number of *mitzvos* that deal with the need for self-control. He pointed out the importance of distinguishing between indulgence and withdrawal. The most striking example had to do with food. We are permitted to eat most foods, but we also have to learn that there is a time for withdrawal. We can indulge in kosher food but must withdraw from foods that are *treif*. That goes back to the very beginning of creation. Adam and Chava had the choice of indulging in all the luscious fruits of *Gan Eden* but had to experience withdrawal in passing the *Eitz Hadas*. This explains the *Gemara in Chulin* 139b “Where do we find a reference to Haman in the Torah?” The *Gemara* answers, “*ha-min ha-etz*” From the tree that I commanded you not to eat, you did eat. Obviously the lack of self-control was considered a very serious matter.

On one occasion, while lecturing to a group of nursing students I was asked to explain the concept

of *basar b'cholov*, the prohibition of mixing meat and dairy. I answered, although I have no sources for this answer, that these represent two completely different experiences. When eating dairy food, we know that we have done a favor to an animal by relieving her from an excessive amount of milk. Eating meat, on the other hand, involves an act of killing a live animal. The Torah said, don't mix the two. They are completely different and contradictory experiences. This distinction is also meant to focus our attention on the consequences of our deeds. Are we doing something that will bring pleasure to others or will it cause pain and suffering? I used that as a means of signaling to my children to think twice about what they are about to do. Will it be a milk act or a meat act?

There is much in the Torah that teaches the importance of self-control. For example, as part of the marital relationship, the Torah encourages and demands that the husband satisfy the physical needs of his spouse. We call this indulgence. Yet, the Torah, in a strict manner, also insists that there be times of withdrawal in that relationship.

One may also suggest that the law of *shaatnes* is connected to the idea of withdrawal. Although we speak of it primarily as a *chok*, still, why are we forbidden to mix wool and linen? Valid reasons have been given for this *mitzvah*, but perhaps it can also be said that this too is, in part, a lesson of self-control. Yes, you can wear what you want,

but there are limits. You cannot wear an outfit made of linen and wool.

Perhaps, in addition to the many fine suggestions given by Dr. Fried, more emphasis should be placed on internalizing the intention of the *mitzvos* in the Torah that directly focus on this question of self-control.

Abraham Kelman, Dean
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Aharon Hersh Fried Responds:

The letter sent to the editor as well as other letters and comments that I received (some in emails, some from web logs), mostly affirming my comments but some detracting, tell me that a conversation around the topic of connecting learning to doing, specifically in the area of *derech eretz* and *middos*, has begun amongst parents and educators. That was the main point for writing this article, and I am glad that it seems to have taken. There is a good chance that from this conversation things may improve; יהי זה חלקי מכל עמלי.

Some wrote or commented that the anecdotes I related were "too extreme." One person even suggested that I made them up to strengthen my argument; others felt the anecdotes were true, but only for New York. Let me assure the readers that the anecdotes are unfortunately all too real (reality is often stranger than fiction), and if anything they are relatively mild, as

I, in fact, left out the more shocking anecdotes I had heard and experienced, so as to attenuate the hurt that I anticipated some might feel on reading them. And, a number of the stories happened not in New York, but “out of town.”

Some felt that I should not have brought such material into the open, citing their version of the “national security” defense, feeling that I was maligning and undermining the yeshivos. My article spoke not only of the yeshivos. It spoke of the community of both yeshivos and homes, of rabbeyim, and teachers, and of parents, and community members—all of whom have an influence on our children. The article had one purpose—that of getting us to improve. A system that is too sensitive and defensive to hear its shortcomings cannot improve. But improve we must.

One writer was upset that I had not mentioned Rebbe Yisroel Salanter זצ”ל who much earlier had spoken of the issues that I am raising, and instituted *limud ha-mussar* as an antidote. I regret this omission and urge readers to seek out the writings of Rebbe Yisroel and his *talmidim*.

One “disheartened” parent (his words) touched on a real and painful issue. He wrote about a “disconnect” between yeshivos and many parents on the role and importance of secular education, and how it leads to a conflict as to who knows what is best for the child. The writer went so far as to assert that “the yeshivos have a specific agenda—to keep the yeshivos

filled,” and that this agenda alone determines the advice they offer their *talmidim*. I must take strong exception to this. It is just not true. Most *mechanchim* sincerely believe that when a boy leaves yeshiva, even when he has not been learning well, his spiritual life is endangered. This agenda, of keeping boys and girls in the fold and *frum*, is what guides the advice they give to our young. This is an admirable and kosher motive, even if it is sometimes applied from a very narrow and egocentric perspective.

This parent also complained about the lack of respect by *rabbeyim* for parents, and the resultant disrespect of their *talmidim* for parents. While this is a painful matter, it is, however, mirrored, almost perfectly—by the lack of respect by parents for *rabbeyim* and teachers, and the resultant disrespect of their children for *rabbeyim* and teachers. I tried to write a response to this issue in the form of a letter, but found that I could not do justice to the topic in a “letter” format. I am preparing a separate article on this painful topic and I hope to get it published in the near future. I thank the reader for raising the issue.

Let me, finally, address the letter published in this issue:

Rabbi Kelman’s input is welcome and well taken. His report of Rav Pam זצ”ל’s suggestion that the undertaking of *chesed* projects strengthens *middos* was a source of *chizuk* to me. Certainly, as Rabbi Kelman writes in the name of Rav Soloveichik זצ”ל, self-control is the most basic and primary *middah* un-

derlying all of Torah. As Chazal say (לא נתנו המצות; בראשית רבה מד, א); אלא לצרף בהן את הבריות, *The Mitzvos were given only to refine mankind*, i.e., by forcing people to practice self-control. And in fact, I quote the Chazon Ish (p. 23 of the article) as saying that this is the primary *mid-dah* that a Jew must have. Rabbi Kelman's broader application of this principle and his novel insights are enlightening indeed. His insights regarding the importance of our children having "gut reactions" to Torah prohibitions are also to the point.

Rambam

IN THE MOST RECENT issue of *Hakirah*, R. Asher Benzion Buchman refers to Maimonides' famous letter to the sages of Lunel. In this letter he downplays the significance of secular learning. "Many strange and foreign women have nevertheless become rival wives to her [i.e., Torah study]: Moabites, Edomites, Sidonites, Hittites. The Lord, may He be blessed, knows that I took these other women in the first instance only in order to serve as perfumers, cooks, and bakers for her [i.e., my true bride], and to show the peoples and the princes her beauty" (translation in Isadore Twersky, *Introduction to the Code of Maimonides* [New Haven, 1980], p. 40).

Buchman states that

[O]ne cannot possibly believe that this oft-quoted (especially

in our day) passage was actually written by Rambam... How can one read this introduction—a devaluation of secular learning, and not be shocked at finding it attributed to Rambam? One should read it after the introductory letter to the *Moreh* and ask himself if these two letters can be reconciled. In addition, the metaphor of "foreign women" comes from the hand of a R. Abba Mari follower in Provence or one influenced by the Rashba of Cordova, but not from Rambam. (pp. 237-238)

Unfortunately, Buchman shows a lack of sophistication in dealing with Maimonides. To begin with, there are any number of contradictions in Maimonides' writings, including examples just as serious as what Buchman has pointed to. Does one then start to throw out writings from Maimonides if they cannot be "reconciled"? Let me reiterate what I recently wrote in *Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters*, pp. 76-77: There is absolutely no basis for impugning the integrity of Maimonides' letters to the sages of Lunel.

Incredibly, Buchman raises the possibility that the letter was written by someone in Europe. Let me remind readers that we are not dealing with something recently discovered, but with a correspondence discussed by *rishonim*, including Maimonides' own son, R. Abraham! Even if Buchman wishes to claim that, if not the entire letter, at the very least the section referred to above has been interpolated, the fact remains that there is

absolutely no evidence for this. What is driving Buchman is that he doesn't like what the letter says. Yet such a methodology is no different from, and just as faulty as, R. Jacob Emden's claim that the *Guide* couldn't have been written by Maimonides, because Rambam would never write such things.

How, then, should we understand Maimonides' downplaying of non-Torah studies in this letter, which stands in contradiction to what he writes elsewhere? My late teacher, Prof. Isadore Twersky, suggested that perhaps Maimonides' statement here "about sciences as handmaidens should be interpreted to refer to the ancillary sciences in the original sense of the term *ancilla*, i.e., logic and related arts. *Hokmah* per se, the core of metaphysics, is not alien" (*ibid.*, p. 499, n. 367).

There is another way to look at the issue. In discussing difficulties in another Maimonidean letter, Twersky wrote: "Some apologetic overtones in this detailed rebuttal are obvious and not all emphases are readily integrated with earlier statements" (*ibid.*, pp. 31-32). I am surprised that Twersky did not apply this insight to the case at hand. The existence of apologetics in Maimonides' writings, that is, that he would sometimes formulate his words with the religious sensitivities of the reader in mind, is a well-known feature of Maimonidean scholarship. Rather than positing that Maimonides' downplaying of non-Torah learning is a forgery, we should assume that his words were chosen to appeal to the sages

of Lunel, who came from a culture that wasn't predisposed to philosophical study.

Marc B. Shapiro
University of Scranton

Asher Benzion Buchman responds:

Indeed Dr. Shapiro has revealed my lack of "sophistication" in dealing with Maimonides, as I am but a mere "hagiographer" who, like Rav Yosef Kappach, insists that these letters are forgeries, and actually expects Rambam to be consistent, clear, and sincere. In his *Studies in Maimonides and His Interpreters* Dr. Shapiro points out the futility of the approach of those of my ilk. However, I would ask the sophisticated reader to decide whether Dr. Shapiro has actually provided any "evidence" to his contentions. See pages 107-154 in the present issue that question Dr. Shapiro's assumptions and especially pages 148-154 that deal with the forgeries from Lunel. This essay was written before *Hakirah* received Dr. Shapiro's letter in late October, and it in fact anticipated his rebuke of my "incredible" claims. I would add, in direct response to Dr. Shapiro's contention, that there are other contradictions "just as serious as what Buchman has pointed to,"—that I do not believe that he can refer us to anything as serious as Rambam disavowing a cornerstone of his religious philosophy stated in the second chapter of *Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah*, and reiterated throughout *Moreh Nevuchim*.

Parshah Management

I WOULD LIKE to thank Drs. Epstein, Dickman and Wilamowsky for their excellent article “Parsha Management” (*Hakirah*, vol. 2, pp. 71–118) which I became aware of only after I had written my article “תלתא אפטרתא דפורענותא” (*Hakirah*, vol. 6, pp. כג – לה). There are a few statements there with which I take strong issue and hope they will be clarified:

1) On p. 80 they prefer the reading “נהגו כל ישראל” found in Rabbi Kappach’s edition of Rambam re: the reading of the three “*haftarot* of punishment” as opposed to the reading of the standard text which reads “נהגו העם” and is somewhat less inclusive. I question this “preference” since the Italian and Babylonian communities, and possibly other prominent communities, did *not* have this custom of reading the three “*haftarot* of punishment” during the three weeks before Tisha B’Av.

2) In order to reconcile Rambam’s “list” of *haftarot* for the weeks before and after Tisha B’Av in Chapter 13 of *Hilchos Tefilla* with his “list” at the end of the book of *Abava* they claim:

“It would appear that the only way to reconcile all of these statements would be to assume that Rambam meant that the special *haftaros* readings prior to and after Tisha B’Av, as well as the one on the Shabbos before Yom Kippur, are *in addition* to

the standard *haftaros* which relate to the given *parshiyos*.”

There is not a shadow of doubt in my mind that this was certainly not the Rambam’s intention, nor does this solution conform to the Rambam’s “style.” In my article I have offered a different approach to help us understand the two different “lists” of the Rambam.

3) They suggest (p. 81) that:

“the reason he only mentioned the readings of the 7 weeks after Tisha B’Av at the end of *Abava* and not the others, was because it is only the 7 after Tisha B’Av that are not necessarily universally practiced.”

I do not follow their logic here at all, especially since Rambam uses this very same term: “וכן נהגו רוב העם” in conjunction with another universal practice: that of reading the *haftara* of the second *parsha* when two *parshiyos* are read on Shabbos. In fact, it seems to me that Rambam’s position is the exact opposite of the authors’! With regard to the three *haftarot* before Tisha B’Av, he uses the term: “נהגו העם” while with regard to the seven *haftarot* after Tisha B’Av, he says: “וכן נהגו רוב העם”. And more important, why would Rambam deem it necessary to mention a custom “not universally practiced”?

4) They say in fn. 14:

“Our interpretation also seems to be against רמא אר”ה תכה:ב who writes: ויש אומרים שאין... להפסיק מנביא לנביא, However,

there is no indication that Rambam agrees with this rule.”

Have they not seen the explicit ruling of the Rambam, in Chapter 12 of *Hilchos Tefilla*, which is in perfect conformity with the רמ"א?

5) They attempt to offer proof from a Rema (דרכי משה; *Tur*, 425:3) that there were customs to read two separate *haftaros*. Clearly the Rema is referring to those communities that added one or two verses from a second *haftara* (prophet), as for example on *Erev Rosh Chodesh*, or even added seven verses from “שׁוֹשׁ אֲשִׁישׁ”, from the book of ישעיהו, in honor of a groom. But even this custom was practiced only in Vienna, as is noted by the *poskim*. And I have not found any trace of this custom mentioned by any Sephardic authority. Their solution, namely that Rambam authorizes the reading of two *haftaros* from two different prophets, is not valid at all.

Nosson David Rabinowich
Brooklyn, NY

The authors respond:

Point 1: Rabbi Rabinowich is confusing footnotes 12 and 13. In fn. 12, the one he cites, we merely point out the difference between Kappach’s text and the conventional text. We offer no opinion as to which we prefer. We chose the Kappach text not because we thought it was “better” but because, as stated earlier in the paper (fn. 8), all of our Rambam citations

are from Mechon Mamre, which is based on Rav Kappach’s lifetime of scholarly and meticulous review of source documents. In fn. 13 we discuss a second discrepancy and comment that we prefer Kappach’s version. The choice here is not “נהגו כל ישראל” but between עירנו and עירינו. The custom of the Italian and Babylonian communities is not relevant to this.

Point 2: With respect to our understanding of Rambam’s presentation, Rabbi Rabinowich writes: “nor does this solution conform to the Rambam’s ‘style.’” He offers no specific example of why it does not conform but merely asserts that it is undeniably so. Without significant clarification of this point it is impossible for us to respond. Our main evidence for understanding Rambam as we do is the fact that at the end of *Abavah*, before listing all *haftaros*, Rambam writes:

נז. העניינות שנהגו רוב העם לקרות
מן הנביאים בכל שבת ושבת,
ומפטירין בהן; ואלו הן:

And after listing all of the different *haftaros* he concludes:

סג. וכן נהגו רוב העם, להיות
מפטירין בנחמות ישעיה, מאחר
תשעה באב עד ראש השנה:

סג. וכן נהגו רוב העם, להיות מפטירין בנחמות ישעיה, מאחר תשעה באב עד ראש השנה: cannot be doing both things unless the latter means “in addition” to the former.

Point 3: Rabbi Rabinowich writes “I do not follow their logic here at all, especially since the Rambam

uses this very same term: “וכן נהגו” in conjunction with another universal practice: that of reading the *haftara* of the second *parsha* when two *parshiyos* are read on Shabbos.” He is incorrect on two counts:

1) Rambam does not use the expression “וכן נהגו רוב העם” but rather:

סב. כל שבת שקורין בה שתי פרשייות, מפטירין בה מעניין פרשה אחרונה; וזה הוא המנהג, ברוב המקומות.

2) Reading the second *haftara* was not a “universal practice.” See, for example, the very same Mordechai he references in fn. כג:

מגילה תתלא: אמרו משום ר"י הלוי שהנהיג אביו בפ' ראשונה ולא בשניה לפי...

His suggestion that “וכן נהגו רוב” refers to something that is universally practiced because “why would the Rambam deem it necessary to mention a custom not universally practiced?” is refuted by the very example he brings from the case of the two *parshiyos* and also from the simple meaning of the term.

Since, in our *Hakirah* vol. 2 article, the discussion of the reading of the *haftaros* was only incidental to the major theme of the paper, we did not fully elaborate there on our reasons for interpreting Rambam the way we did nor on Rambam’s choice of presentation. We thank Rabbi Rabinowich for giving us the opportunity to more fully explain ourselves in this response. It appears to us that the simplest

explanation for Rambam’s mentioning only the readings of the 7 weeks but not the 3 prior ones or *Shvab* at the end of *Tefillah*, is because he already fully itemized them in *Hilchos Tefillah*. Why repeat it when he said in his main body of work exactly what is done by כל ישראל? It is only the list of the *haftaros* of all of the *parshiyos* and the 7 specific readings after Tisha B’Av that are not practiced by everyone that Rambam alluded to but did not detail in *Hilchos Tefillah* and now supplies at the end of *Abava*. This explanation is simple and maintains the style and plain meaning of all the terms in Rambam.

Point 4: We are very familiar with the citation from Rambam *Hilchos Tefilla* 12:13:

יג. המפטיר... ומדלג מעניין לעניין אחר; ואינו מדלג מנביא לנביא, אלא בנביאים של שנים עשר בלבד — ובלבד שלא ידלג מסוף הספר, לתחילתו: וכל המדלג, לא ישהה בדילוג אלא כדי שישלים המתרגם תרגומו.

This Rambam is based on a Mishnah in *Megillah* and neither the Mishnah nor the Gemara offers a dissenting view. Yet *Mechaber O. C.* 425:2 says that if *Rosh Chodesh* is on *Shabbos* and Sunday, the *Shabbos haftara* is השמים כסאי followed by the first and last *pesukim* of ויאמר לו יהונתן, and *Rema* 425:2 (that Rabbi Rabinowich cited) says:

ויש אומרים שאין להפסיק מנביא לנביא.

In *Darhei Moshe* he is even more explicit and says:

ודוקא במקום שנהגו להפטיר ב' הפטרות.

(Both of these citations are in our paper.) To what dissenting view is *Rema* referring?

The key to understanding these issues is an appreciation of changes that took place in the reading of *haftaros* after the writing of the Mishnah. Note that Rabbi Rabinowich references Rambam in the 12th chapter of *Tefillah* while our discussion of *haftara* readings is from the 13th chapter. *Kesef Mishna, Tefillah* 12:12 says:

ונראה שלא היה להם באותו זמן הפטרות קבועות כמונו היום אלא כל אחד היה מפטיר ענין שנראה לו שהוא מתייחס לפרשה וגם בזמננו זה יש חילוק מנהגים בהפטרות.

I.e. the choice of *haftaros* read in Mishnaic times was open to the reader within certain limitations, e.g. it had to be: relevant, non-defamatory and not unduly taxing on the congregation. Thus, for example, reading *haftaros* from two *Nevi'im* was considered unnecessary and not acceptable. In chapter 13 Rambam is talking about actual practice in his time and clearly indicates that there had come to be a uniform acceptance by congregations as to what was the proper *haftara* for each *parsha*. Individual selection was no longer practiced. The limitations on which the Mishnah unequivocally rules, and which Rambam discusses in the 12th chapter that reflect a problem of *צירחא דציבורא*, were not operative if the *tzibur* itself decided to accept them. We indeed find a similar concept with respect to

reading the Torah on Shabbosim that have Torah readings from two or more different places (e.g. *Shabbos Rosh Chodesh*). Rambam unequivocally does not allow, in such situations, burdening the *tzibur* by reading both portions from the same *Sefer Torah*:

יב:כג אין קוראין בחומשין בבתי כנסיות, משום כבוד הציבור; ואין גוללין ספר תורה בציבור, שלא יטריח עליהן להיותן עומדין, עד שיגלול. לפיכך אם צרכו לקרות שני עניינין, מוציאין שני ספרי תורות...

At the same time *Mechaber* 144:3 theoretically agrees but concludes:

ואם אין להם אלא ס"ת אחד והם צריכים לקרות בשני עניינים גוללין וידחה כבוד הציבור.

Magen Avraham explains that in a *kehillah* environment the people can collectively agree to overlook their *צירחא דציבורא*. (We will not discuss here an interesting question as to the difference between *כבוד הציבור* and *צירחא דציבורא*. See also page 144 of this journal, which cites a *Teshuvah HaRambam* that specifically makes this point on Rambam's permitting reading from a *Chumash* if there is no *Sefer Torah*.)

The regimentation of the *haftaros* was not, however, the only change that had taken place in *haftara* readings since Mishnaic times. Concerning *Mechaber's* comment in 144:2, that on several occasions there is a custom to read the regular *haftara* of the *parsha* and then add several *pesukim* from another *Navi*, *Taz* comments:

הטעם בב"י בשם ת"ה דבימי התלמוד היו כל הספרים נכתבים בגליון והיו

צריכי לשהוי אבל לדין שהספרים
נכתבים בקונטרסי ויכול לעשות סימן
שימצא במהרה.

Thus there would be no problem today in reading two *haftaros* from different *Neviim*.

Rabbi Rabinowich clearly does not agree that Rambam could allow such *haftara* reading. We note that in the second point of Rabbi Rabinowich's letter he says his article offers "a different approach to help us understand the two different 'lists' of the Rambam." However, in his article he addresses only why Rambam omitted the *haftara* readings of the weeks prior to Tisha B'Av from the end of *Abava*. He does not address the contradiction between the *haftaros* that Rambam says in *Hilchos Tefillah* are read the 3 weeks prior to Tisha B'Av and those he says at the end of *Abava* are read for every *parsha*, nor the contradiction at the end of *Abava* itself on how to reconcile the readings of the weekly *haftaros* with the readings of the 7 weeks after Tisha B'Av. Our answer addresses all of the potential contradictions.

Point 5: We have given the rationale for our understanding of the *Rema* in the previous point. Rabbi Rabinowich prefers to differentiate between permitting the addition of a single verse, 2 verses or even 7 verses but not more. In our opinion this distinction is arbitrary and unmotivated and does not address how it does not violate **טירהא דציבורא**. He says he "never saw any Sephardic *posek*" calling for the reading of more than a single

haftara. As we explained previously, we feel that is exactly what Rambam's language says here.

Boz Yavuzu Lo

IN THE ARTICLE "Boz Yavuzu Lo," p. 65, the author quotes from a *teshuva* of Rav Hai Gaon. In footnote 54 he remarks that Rav Hai Gaon implies that one's reward is commensurate only with one's intentions and speculates that if an individual studies Torah only at a 'lo lishma' level but never reaches a 'lishma' level, there is little or no value to such a persons' learning. I would point out that this would indeed seem to be Rambam's position as well as his son's position. The author, I'm sure, is aware of the position of Tosfot that resolves the apparent contradiction between two gemaras' characterization of *lo lishma* by saying that when the gemara states that one who learns *lo lishma* would have been better off never born, that is referring to one who learns only to critique and antagonize without intending to keep the mitzvot. However, the gemara in *Pesachim* that has a more positive outlook on *lo lishma* is referring to one who intends to keep the mitzvot. His personal motives are immature but not antagonistic. However, both Rambam and R. Avraham ben HaRambam maintain that the gemaras do contradict each other. Both statements are true. It is better to learn *lishma*, but if a person learns only *lo lishma*, it would have been better had he

never been born. Rambam says this in a letter to R. Pinchas Ha-Dayyan. (Shilat, *Iggerot HaRambam* vol. 2, p. 460). Also, R. Avraham ben HaRambam in *Hamaspike L'Oved Hashem*, in the beginning of Chapter 'Al Ne'emanut Hama-asim,' says the same thing as well, that both statements of Chazal regarding *lo lishma* are true and are not in contradiction with each other. As referred to the end of *Hilbot Teshuva*, this position that Rambam makes explicitly in the letter I referred to is certainly im-

plicit in *Hilbot Teshuva*. It would appear according to them that any type of *lo lishma*, where one subordinates the true benefit of Torah and mitzvot for some other mundane benefit, albeit a major distortion that keeps the Torah study and practice from perfecting the individual, nevertheless lays the groundwork for *lishma* observance.

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